Meaning of “Public Authority” under RTI Act

According to the Delhi High Court, a service matter cannot be included by the definition of “public authority” found in Section 2(h) of the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005.

A case under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure from 1973 was being handled by Justice C. Hari Shankar in a routine second appeal. Rakesh Kumar Sharma filed the application, which sought to begin criminal proceedings against Mother Dairy, Fruit & Vegetables Private Limited for allegedly lying in its counter-affidavit.

The affidavit states that the provisions of Article 311 of the Indian Constitution cannot be expanded to govern the appellant’s condition of service. The employment of the appellant with the other party had been solely contractual in character, the conditions of service of the appellant were not governed by any legislative terms and conditions, and the appellant did not obtain any status and hence could not seek the declaratory relief.

The petitioner’s counsel claimed that because the allegations in the aforementioned affidavit were in direct conflict with the High Court’s ruling in Mother Dairy Fruit & Vegetable Pvt. Ltd. v. Hatim Ali & Anr., the respondents were subject to the harsh penalties of Section 340 Cr.P.C.

In the aforementioned judgment, the Court considered whether the respondent qualified as a “public authority” under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

The Court stated that the present application is completely misplaced after reading the Mother Dairy Fruit & Vegetable Pvt. Ltd ruling.

It noticed, “It is true that the RTI Act is not at issue in the current case. The current issue, which is in the form of a service dispute between the petitioner and the respondent, has absolutely nothing to do with the concept of “public authority” found in Section 2(h) of the RTI Act.”

The Court further noted that even if the respondent had asserted that it was not a “public authority,” that assertion could not have served as a basis for invoking Section 340 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Additionally, it was noted that the decision on which the petitioner had cited dealt with the RT Act’s definition of “public authority,” which was unique and did not apply to the current issue.

Having said that, it is evident when you read the allegedly perjurious wording from the respondent’s reply—which was provided in response to RSA 94/2019—that the respondent never argued whether or not it is a “public authority. In fact, because it is a term inherent to the RTI Act, the question of whether the respondent is a “public authority” may not even come up for discussion in the current case “explained the Court.

The Court was of the opinion that the unauthorized invocation of Section 340 Cr.P.C. was coercive in nature and was designed to intimidate the opposing party by having criminal proceedings hanging over it, even though it noted that the application was out of place and likely to be dismissed.

The statement added, “This Court has already expressed dissatisfaction with the tendency of civil litigants to use Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. in civil actions “The court then rejected the argument, imposing a cost of Rs. 5,000 that must be paid by crossing check made out to the Delhi High Court Staff Welfare Fund.